Context-based secure controller operation and malware prevention

ABSTRACT

In one implementation, a method for providing security on an externally connected controller includes launching, by the controller, a security layer that includes a whitelist of permitted processes on the controller, the whitelist including (i) signatures for processes that are authorized to be executed and (ii) context information identifying permitted controller contexts within which the processes are authorized to be executed; determining, by the security layer, whether the particular process is permitted to be run on the controller based on a comparison of the determined signature with a verified signature for the particular process from the whitelist; identifying, by the security layer, a current context for the controller; determining by the security layer, whether the particular process is permitted to be run on the controller based on a comparison of the current context with one or more permitted controller contexts for the particular process from the whitelist.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No.17/374,593, filed on Jul. 13, 2021, which is a continuation of U.S.application Ser. No. 15/758,234, filed on Mar. 7, 2018, which issued asU.S. Pat. No. 11,068,580 on Jul. 20, 2021, which is a National StageApplication under 35 U.S.C. § 371 claiming the benefit of InternationalApplication No. PCT/IB2016/055337, filed on Sep. 7, 2016, which claimspriority under 35 U.S.C. § 119 to U.S. Provisional Patent ApplicationNo. 62/215,065, titled “SYSTEM AND METHODS FOR SECURING AN AUTOMOTIVECONTROLLER,” which was filed on Sep. 7, 2015, the entire contents ofeach of which is hereby incorporated herein by reference.

TECHNICAL FIELD

This specification generally relates to security for computer-basedcontrollers, such as controllers for Internet of Things (IoT) devices.

BACKGROUND

More devices are becoming “smarter” with hardware and software thatpermit them to communicate via the internet, such as through cellularwireless networks, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth. These internet-connecteddevices are often identified as being part of the “Internet of Things”(IoT), which is a term that broadly encompasses internet-connecteddevices configured to transmit and receive information related to theiroperation, such as status information. For example, many consumerproducts are now IoT devices with internet-connected features such ashome automation devices (e.g., wirelessly controllable light switches),appliances (e.g., smart refrigerators able to transmit images of thefridge's contents), and automobiles (e.g., internet-connectedcomponents, such as infotainment and navigation devices). For instance,modern vehicles can have over 100 controllers, or Electronic ControlUnits (ECUs), that an responsible for running most of the car'sfunctions, such as the steering wheel, engine, braking system, airbags,and navigation systems.

Like any other externally connected computers, IoT devices (e.g., ECUsin connected cars) are vulnerable to cyber attack and have becometargets for hackers. For example, controllers on several makes andmodels of cars, such as the JEEP CHEROKEE, TOYOTA PRIUS, TESLA MODEL S,and NISSAN LEAF, have been successfully targeted and exploited by whitehat hackers. Those hackers were able to compromise the vehicles and takecommand of nearly all of the control aspects, ranging from turning onthe radio and windshield wipers to killing the engine while the cardrove on the freeway. These exploits caused some of these carmanufacturers to issue a recall on affected vehicles.

Cyber attacks come in many forms and flavors, but they generally sharethe same basic concepts: find a preexisting security bug (vulnerability)in the system's software, exploit it, and run malware. A common securitybugs is neglecting to verify the size of input buffers, which hackerscan exploit by passing long buffers that get out of the boundariesallocated for that buffer on the software stack. By getting out of thebuffer boundaries, hackers may be able to access and change the pointerstructure that controls the functional flow of code, which hackers canuse to direct the controller to execute malware code. Although malwarecode can vary (e.g., keylogger, ransomware, e-mail spam), theexploitation mechanism is often similar—find a security bug, researchand learn how to exploit it in order to gain control, and use thecontrol to run the malware code.

SUMMARY

This document generally describes a technological solution that hardensexternally connected controllers (e.g., ECUs) within an IoT device(e.g., connected automobile) against hackers. Customized securitypolicies for controllers can be generated and added to controllers withsecurity layers, which can use the security policies and layers toensure that only valid code and valid behaviors are allowed to run onthe controllers. Various features can be used to ensure controllers arelimited to operating with valid code and valid behaviors, such as usingwhitelists that define permitted code and to define permitted contextswithin which the code can run.

For example, ECUs on a car can each include a custom security policythat defines whitelisted processes and contexts within which thoseprocesses are permitted to run. When an ECU encounters a process that isnot authorized to run or that is operating outside of its permittedcontext, the ECU can block the process from operating. Automotive ECUscan use any of a variety of different contexts to determine whether aprocess is operating within its permitted bounds, such as location-basedcontexts (e.g., GPS location, street, home, work, freeway, parking lot,garage), proximity contexts (e.g., nearby objects, distance toapproaching objects, speed and trajectory relative to other movingobjects), operational contexts (e.g., driving, parked, current speed, indrive, in reverse, idle), user-related contexts (e.g., connecteddevices, current infotainment system usage, automated systems enabled bythe user, such as cruise control, parking assist, driving assist),and/or other contexts. By using context-based whitelists to determinewhether and when to permit particular processes to operate, ECUs canmaintain secure Operation and prevent the attacks from ever infiltratingthe IoT device's infrastructure, such as a car's Controller Area Network(CAN Bus).

By focusing on hardening the controllers within IoT devices/systems thatare open to external access (via the Internet, WiFi, Bluetooth,etc.)—meaning restricting the operations and behavior of the controllersto a set of expected operations and behaviors—the controllers can betransformed from potential security vulnerabilities into gates thatprevent and block hacker attempts to get into the controller's internalinfrastructure, essentially stopping hacker attacks on IoT devices.Endpoint security layers can stop attacks on controller by blockinghackers at the gate using context-based whitelists—meaning an externallyfacing entry point into a device and/or system, such as at externallyfacing ECUs in an automobile that, if compromised, could provide accessto the CAN Bus. As a result, attacks cannot make it inside of an IoTdevice/system, which can prevent access to and control of an IoTdevice/system's functions.

Context-based secure controller operation and malware prevention can beintegrated through endpoint security clients incorporated into theoperating system of controllers programmed to implement one or moresecurity layers, such as whitelist enforcement layer. Whitelist layerscan use signatures for binary (and/or script) codes on the system, whichkernel modules can be checked against upon execution to verify theirauthenticity, and can include permitted contexts within which the binarycodes (and/or scripts) can operate on particular controllers. Additionalwhitelist layers can also be used. When operation is detected outside ofthe approved context included in a custom security policy for acontroller, it can indicate that that a malware is attempting exploit avulnerability (i.e., software bug on the controller to run unauthorisedcode in memory, and can be blocked and reported.

In one implementation, a method for providing security on an externallyconnected controller includes launching, by the controller, a kernellevel security layer that includes a whitelist of permitted processes onthe controller, the whitelist being part of a custom security policy forthe controller and including (i) signatures for processes that areauthorized to be executed by the controller and (ii) context informationidentifying permitted controller contexts within which the processes areauthorized to be executed by the controller; receiving, at the securitylayer, a request to run a particular process; determining, by thesecurity layer, a signature for the particular process; determining, bythe security layer, whether the particular process is permitted to berun on the controller based on a comparison of the determined signaturewith a verified signature for the particular process from the whitelist;identifying, by the security layer, a current context for thecontroller; determining, by the security layer, whether the particularprocess is permitted to be run on the controller based on a comparisonof the current context with one or more permitted controller contextsfor the particular process from the whitelist; and blocking, by thesecurity layer, the particular process from running on the automotivecontroller based on determining one or more of: the determined signaturenot matching the verified signature for the process and the currentcontext not being included in the one or more permitted controllercontexts.

Such an implementation can optionally include one or more of thefollowing features. The whitelist can be generated for the controllerbased on static analysis of an operating system for the controller. Themethod can further include reporting, by the controller and to a serversystem, information that identifies the particular process as beingblocked, wherein the information is reported to the server systemwithout the particular process being executed by the controller andwithout prior transmission with the server system regarding theparticular process. The controller can be an automotive electroniccontrol unit (ECU). The ECU can be selected from the group consisting ofan infotainment controller, an telematics controller, a main computercontroller, an ABS system controller, a navigation system controller, acommunication system controller, a braking system controller, an air bagsystem controller, and a wheel pressure controller. The one or morepermitted contexts can include one or more of: an initiation state, ashutdown state, an operational state, and in motion state.

In another implementation, a system for securely executing an externallyconnected controller can include memory storing a whitelist; and acontroller programmed to: launch a kernel level security layer that usesthe whitelist defining permitted processes on the controller, thewhitelist being part of a custom security policy for the controller andincluding (i) signatures for processes that are authorized to beexecuted by the controller and (ii) context information identifyingpermitted controller contexts within which the processes are authorizedto be executed by the controller; receive a request to run a particularprocess; determine a signature for the particular process; determinewhether the particular process is permitted to be run on the controllerbased on a comparison of the determined signature with a verifiedsignature for the particular process from the whitelist; identifying acurrent context for the controller; determine whether the particularprocess is permitted to be run on the controller based on a comparisonof the current context with one or more permitted controller contextsfor the particular process from the whitelist; and block the particularprocess from running on the controller based on determining one or moreof the determined signature not matching the verified signature for theprocess and the current context not being included in the one or morepermitted controller contexts.

Such an implementation can optionally include one or more of thefollowing features. The whitelist can be generated for the controllerbased on static analysis of an operating system for the controller. Thecontroller can further be programmed to report, to a server system,information that identifies the particular process as being blocked,wherein the information is reported to the server system without theparticular process being executed by the controller and without priortransmission with the server system regarding the particular process.The controller can be an automotive electronic control unit (ECU). TheECU can be selected from the group consisting of an infotainmentcontroller, an telematics controller, a main computer controller, an ABSsystem controller, a navigation system controller, a communicationsystem controller, a braking system controller, an air bag systemcontroller, and a wheel pressure controller. The one or more permittedcontexts can include one or more of: an initiation state, a shutdownstate, an operational state, and in motion state.

Certain implementations can provide one or more of the followingadvantages. For example, endpoint controller security can permitdetection that is much earlier than network-based solutions, which oftenare not able to detect that malware has compromised a controller untilalter the malware has had a chance to run. In contrast, endpointsecurity detects the malware that is not authorized and/or that isoperating outside of its permitted context before it has a chance to runon a controller, which not only prevents the malware from ever beingexecuted but also determines that an operation is malware before it hasbeen executed.

In another example, rather than looking for hackers that are already inan IoT device/system's internal network (e.g., CAN Bus,internally-facing controllers), the disclosed technology can detect andstop an attack from getting into the internal network (e.g., CAN Bus,other controllers) in the first place. For example, the disclosedend-point solution can protect externally connected controllers, whichcan allow for early detection and identification of threats targetingthe IoT device/system and blocking exploits from infiltrating itsinternal components, which can ensure device/system and/or user safety.

Additional and/or alternative advantages are also possible, as describedbelow.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE ATTACHMENTS

FIG. 1A is a conceptual diagram of an example system for generating andimplementing a custom security policy on an example controller.

FIG. 1B is a conceptual diagram of an example system for implementinggenerating and implementing custom security policies on example ECUsthat are part of an example vehicle.

FIG. 2 depicts an example implementation of process verification by asecurity middleware layer on a controller, such as an example of arunning environment in a typical car controller.

FIG. 3 depicts is an example process whitelist.

FIG. 4 is example pseudocode for implementing context-based whitelistson a controller.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart of an example technique for implementing acontext-based whitelist on a controller.

FIG. 6 is a flowchart of an example technique for implementing acontext-based whitelist on a controller.

FIG. 7 is a flowchart of an example technique for implementingcontext-based whitelist on a controller.

FIG. 8 is a block diagram of example computing devices.

Like reference numbers and designations in the various drawings indicatelike elements.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

IoT devices with controllers, such as cars, are vulnerable to hackersthat can take control of controllers remotely. A common way to do thatis to use a known exploit in one of the software processes running onone of the controllers. However, such exploits usually provide theability to execute a binary code too small to cause any damage to theIoT device, such as a car. A more common approach is for that smallfootprint code to download and spawn a large footprint code and executeit as a privileged process. The downloaded malware can be used to takecontrol of the IoT device, which can endanger users, such as the driverand passengers in a car with controllers (e.g., ECUs) that have beencompromised.

Whitelisting is a form of security that uses a list of binary processesthat are allowed to run on an endpoint system with signed digitalsignatures (e.g., md5 or sha-1 hashes, cryptographic public I privatekey based signatures, checksums, etc.). An endpoint operating system canbe modified to implement a whitelist (e.g., by patching the OS, adding akernel module, or other alternatives) that allows only properly signedbinaries to be executed. This approach can provide a good protectionagainst malware (even malware that has never been seen or analyzedbefore) that injects a new binary and tries to launch it, since themalicious process binary is not signed and the OS can simply reject thatmalicious launch attempt.

A whitelist approach can be used for controllers on IoT devices, such asvehicles. Each car controller spawns a unique set of binary processesthat is infrequently updated, and can be easily digitally signed toensure its authenticity, and counter attack any malicious attempt.Moreover, as most malware have to bring their own malicious binarysoftware to run on the attacked controller, whitelisting can beconsidered a security mechanism that provides total security for thevehicle systems.

FIG. 1A is a conceptual diagram of an example system 100 for generatingand implementing a custom context-based security policy on an examplecontroller. The example system 100 includes a policy generation computersystem 104 (e.g., computer server system, cloud computing system, clientcomputing device) that is programmed to generate a custom securitypolicy for a controller, an example IoT device 112 (e.g., ECU) thatincludes an example controller 114 that will use the generated securitypolicy to operate securely and to prevent malware, and a managementcomputer system 122 (e.g., computer server system, cloud computingsystem, client computing device) that is programmed to receive real-timecontroller information, to detect anomalous controller behavior, and toprovide an interface for users to view real-time controller/devicestatus information. Although not depicted, the system 104, the IoTdevice 112, and the system 122 can communicate over one or morecommunication networks, such as the internet, local area networks (LAN),wide area networks (WAN), virtual private networks (VPN), wirednetworks, wireless networks, mobile data networks, or any combinationthereof.

The policy generation computer system 104 can receive controllersoftware 102, which can include an operating system and/or applicationsthat are to be run on a controller. The policy generation computersystem 104 can use the controller software to automatically generate acustom context-based security policy 108 for the controller that is toexecute the software 102, as indicated by step A (106). For example, thecomputer system 104 can analyze the software 102 to determine a set ofoperations and contextual behaviors that are expected during operationof a controller according to the software 102 (e.g., identify a list ofauthorized binaries, identify a set of contexts within which each of thebinaries are authorized to operate) and can incorporate those operationsand contextual behaviors into the custom security policy 108, which mayinclude one or more whitelists of permitted operations and/or behaviors.Generating the security policy can additionally include generating oneor more signatures for components of the controller software 102, suchas processes/functions that are part of the software 102, that can beused to verify that the code being executed as part of the software 102is authentic and has not been modified/altered/replaced by malware. Byautomatically generating a security policy 108 from the controllersoftware 102—meaning without needing manual design forimplementation/generation—the system 100 can reduce the burden, cost,and time to generate and implement security layers on controllers, whichcan increase controller security.

The policy generation can be performed by the computer system 104 in away that does not necessitate any sort of modification to the controllersoftware 102. For example, the custom policy 108 can be separate fromand not rely on modification of the software 102 in order to operate. Bygenerating and implementing the security policy 108 without having tomodify or alter the controller software 102, the system 100 canadditionally reduce the burden on security layer implementation, whichcan increase security layer implementation and overall controllersecurity. For example, if the controller software 102 were to bemodified in significant ways in order to incorporate the security policy108, the software 102 would need to be verified and tested again afterthe security policy 108 has been integrated into the system, which canslow time to deployment and can delay the incorporation of securitylayers on controllers.

The computer system 104 (and/or other computer systems, such as originalequipment manufacturers (OEM)) can load the software 102 and thesecurity policy 108 for the controller 114 of the IoT device 112, asindicated by step B (110). For example, the controller software 102 andthe security policy 108 can be flashed onto the controller 114.

The controller 114 can securely operate using the controller software102, which is confined to operating within the confines of the securitypolicy 108, as indicated by step C (116). For example, the securitypolicy 108 can include whitelists (and other information) that designateauthorized contextual behaviors and operations for the controller 114that are within expected behavior given a current context 113 for theIoT device 112, according to the controller software 102. The context113 can be determined by the controller 114 based on informationreceived and/or detected about the current state of the IoT device 112and its surroundings, such as through information detected bysensors/devices (e.g., proximity sensors, accelerometers, gyroscopes,GPS chipset), obtained from other controllers and/or devices (e.g.,infotainment system, navigation system, other onboard systems,vehicle-to-vehicle communication network, remote computer system, otherexternal devices/systems). Behaviors/operations that deviate from thoseauthorized behaviors/operations can be prevented from occurring based onthe security policy 108 (e.g., authorized processes, authorized contextsfor the processes to operate within) hardening the controller 114against such behaviors/operations.

For example, the controller software 102 can include one or moreportions of code that make the controller 114 unsecure, which canpotentially affect the security of not only the controller 114 but thedevice 112 (and other devices to which it is connected). Securityvulnerabilities can come in any of a variety of different types, such asbuffer overrun vulnerabilities through which a hacker could potentiallymodify the software stack to cause malware 120 to be loaded onto andexecuted by the controller 114. By operating according the securitypolicy 108 on the controller 114, such malware attempts can be blockedbefore the mal are 120 is loaded/executed by the controller 114, asindicated by step D (118). For example, if the IoT device 112 is an ECUon an automobile, the policy 108 can define a particular set ofprocesses that are authorized and a particular set of contexts withinwhich those processes on the automobile can be executed by thecontroller 114. For instance, an automatic parking process thatautomatically parks a car (e.g., parallel parking) may be restricted toparticular contexts for the automobile, such as the automobile beingstopped and being located on a street or in a parking lot. The whitelistcan then restrict execution of the automatic parking process to contextsthat are permitted (e.g., car stopped, car located on street or inparking lot), and can block attempts to execute the process outside ofthe whitelisted contexts (e.g., block attempts to execute the automaticparking process when the car is travelling at a high rate of speed or islocated on a highway). Processes being executed outside of theirexpected contexts can indicate a possible malware or hacking attack, andcan be blocked by the controller 114 using the security policy 108(defining permitted contexts) before the attempts are able to take rooton the controller 114.

Such hardening of the controller 114—meaning restriction of thecontroller 114 to specific behaviors/operations outlined in the securitypolicy 108—can provide endpoint security that provides a variety ofbenefits. For example, it can allow for early warning of attacks byidentifying attack attempts before they are able to install/run themalware 120 on the controller 114. It can also stops attacks at thegate—meaning preventing attacks from making it onto the controller 114and the device 112 (as opposed to other security solutions that attemptto identify malware once it has already been installed/run on acontroller). It can eliminate false positives (incorrect identificationof attacks) by restricting operation of the controller 114 to only thecode and applications that have explicit permission to run on thecontroller, which can eliminate potential ambiguity (e.g., either thecode is part of the factory settings or not). It can also eliminatesrisk of the policy 108 becoming security vulnerability itself by beingoutdated. For instance, by custom generating the security policy 108 tomatch the current version of the controller software 102, the securitypolicy 108 can continue to harden the controller 114 as the controllersoftware 102 is updated over time. Additionally, this is in contrast toother security policies that may use blacklists seeking to identify andprevent particular malware. Such blacklists may require constantupdating and may continually run the risk of being outdated, which canexpose the controller 114 to potential vulnerabilities. By usingwhitelists in the security policy 108 that outline permittedbehaviors/operations, the security policy 108 can continue to protectthe controller 114 even when new and yet unknown malware attempts arelaunched against the controller 114 and device 112. Quality checks canalso be minimized, which can reduce time for deployment and updates. Forexample, endpoint security layers can be isolated within the controller114, so there may not be a need to rest the operation of the entiredevice 112 (or other devices connected to the device 112) as part of thesecurity layer deployment.

The controller 114 can log information about its operation, includingblocked malware attempts as well as information on secure operation ofthe controller 114 over time, including contexts for the controller 114and the device 112 while various processes are executed. Traces ofblocked malware attempts can include a variety of information, such asthe malware itself, the origin of the malware (e.g., IP address fromwhich the malware originated), the context of the device 112 and/orcontroller 114 when the malware attempt was blocked, and informationidentifying the code segment that provided the malware exploit. Thecontroller 114 can report information on controller operation, asindicated by step E (124). Such reporting can be provided in real-time.For example, the controller 114 can report malware traces in response tothe malware 120 is attempt being blocked. The controller 114 can balancereporting with controller performance against the timeliness ofreporting for less critical information, such as information aboutsecure operation of the controller 114 during periods of time when nomalware attacks were attempted/blocked. For instance, such reports canbe delayed until periods of time when the controller 114 and/or thedevice 112 have at least a sufficient amount of processing capacityand/or network bandwidth available.

The management computer system 122 can receive reports from thecontroller 114 as well as from multiple other controllers and devices,and can aggregate the reports into a central database system. Thereports can be used to provide real-time controller/device information,as indicated by step E (126). For example, the computer system 122 cantransmit real-time information that is presented on client computingdevices (e.g., mobile computing, devices, laptops, desktop computers) inuser interfaces, such as the example user interface 130 that includesstatus information 132 for example controllers C1-C6 and malwareinformation 134 that identifies particular malware that has been blockedby these controllers, as well as other information (e.g.,device/controller context when the malware was blocked). The real-timeinformation can be at any of various levels of granularity such as adevice-level (status information for a specific device) and/or apopulation-level (status information across multiple devices/systems).

The computer system 122 can additionally use the information reported bycontrollers to detect anomalies, as indicated by step E (128). Forexample, the computer system 122 can use statistical analysis toidentify operation/behaviors that are outside of the normal operation ofa controller, such as identifying a particular context for a particularprocess that is a statistical outlier outside of the normal operation ofa controller.

FIG. 1B is a conceptual diagram of an example system 150 forimplementing generating and implementing custom context-based securitypolicies on example ECUs that are part of an example vehicle 152. Theexample system 150 is an example implementation of the system 100 to aspecific IoT context, which in this example is the vehicle 152. Thesystem 100 and the system 150 can be implemented on a variety of otherIoT devices and systems.

In this example, the vehicle 152 includes a control system 154 thatincludes multiple ECUs 156 a-n that each have their own custom securitypolicy 158 a-n, which each define authorized processes and authorizedcontexts for the processes. Although not depicted, the security policies158 a-n can be generated in a similar manner described above with regardto FIG. 1A and the policy generation computer system 104. The securitypolicies 158 a-n can harden the ECUs 156 a-n and can effectively blockmalware attempts 160 a-n, which can be attempts by hackers to find a wayinto the CAN Bus of the vehicle 152. While the vehicle 152 can includeover a hundred ECUs connected to the CAN Bus, only a few may be openexternally (accessible to external networks outside of the vehicle 152,such as the internet). These external ECUs (e.g., ECUs 156 a-n) can bethe gateways into the car and the security policies 158 a-n can stopattackers at these gateways, which can significantly reduce, if noteliminate, the risk of attacks penetrating the car's network, which candisrupt the car's operation.

For example, the security policies 158 a-n can include whitelists forpermitted program binaries, processes, scripts, network behavior, and/orother devices, and can be embedded within the ECUs 156 a-n to ensureonly explicitly allowed code and contextually-approved behaviors for thecode may run on it. By using the security 158 a-n that are specific tothe ECUs 156 a-n, any processes or functions that are outside of theECUs permitted/designed operating behavior can be immediately detectedand stopped from running on the ECUs 156 a-n. This can allow for theECUs 156 a-n to stop malicious code from ever being executed by andpossibly taking control of an ECUs' operation.

For instance, hackers targeting the vehicle 152 can use a “dropper,”which is a small piece of code or operation, to try to exploit avulnerability and implant the malware 160 a-n. The malware 160 a-n isthe code that ultimately tampers with or takes control of the functionof the vehicle 152, which can cause significant damage and put thesafety of the driver and others on the road at risk. By adding anendpoint security layers and policies 158 a-n to ECUs 156 a-n so thatthey use policies outlining whitelists of permitted processes, binaries,etc., and outlining permitted contexts within which the permittedprocesses are able to operate, the ECUs 156 a-n are able to detect theunexpected behavior or operation of a dropper and immediately report onthe attack attempt in real-time, as indicated by step 162. The earlywarning can give the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and systemproviders of the vehicle 152 (and its subparts) time to address thethreat, as indicated by the computer system 164 providing real-timestatus information to a client computing device 168 with information 170on malware that has been blocked across the ECUs 156 a-n (step 166). Forexample, an alert on the malware 160 a-n can include the complete trailof the attack on the ECUs 156 a-n, including its source, path, andcontext of the vehicle 152 and/or ECUs 156 a-n when the attack wasblocked, so vulnerabilities can be fixed and blocked to prevent anymalware from infiltrating the CAN Bus on the vehicle 152.

Dropper and other hacker attempts to introduce the malware 160 a-n onthe externally connected ECUs 156 a-n can be detected by the endpointsecurity lavers and policies 158 a-n as foreign code based on externalcontexts 161 a and/or internal contexts 161 b for the vehicle 152, andcan be blocked when they attempts to run. External contexts 161 a caninclude, for example, the position and movement of the vehicle 152 withregard to other objects (e.g., nearby vehicles, nearby buildings,intersections) and/or location information (e.g., global position,relative location for user, such as home, work, garage). Internalcontexts 161 b can include, for example, the use and status of systemswithin the vehicle, such as infotainment and navigation systems, and thestatus of other controllers within the vehicle 152. For instance, suchdroppers and other hacker attempts are not part of the factory settingsfor the ECUs 156 a-n and/or that are attempting to operate processes onthe ECUs 156 a-n that are outside of their permitted contexts can beblocked from running by the security layers and policies 158 a-n, whichcan stop them from running and prevent them from doing anything todisrupt the safe operation of the vehicle 152. If a dropper does succeedin dropping the malware 160 a-n onto the externally connected ECUs 156a-n, when the malware 160 a-n attempt to run on the ECUs 156 a-n, theendpoint security layer and policies 158 a-n can detect it as foreigncode and block its attempts to run.

Endpoint security layers (e.g., security policy 108, security layer andpolicies 158 a-n) can be implemented on newly deployed controllers andcan be retrofitted on previously released controllers that may not havepreviously included security layers. Such retrofitting can improve thesecurity of devices already in use and can be added as part of regularsoftware updates that drivers receive during regular maintenance andupdating. Once retrofitted, previously deployed controllers can beprotected with endpoint security will be hardened against the cyberthreats targeting them.

FIG. 2 depicts an example implementation of process verification by asecurity middleware layer on a controller, such as an example of arunning environment in a typical car controller. An example system 200is depicted with an example controller 202 using a whitelist 218 (e.g.,process signatures, process contexts) that is part of a custom securitypolicy 216 for the controller 202 to block a malicious process 206. Inthis example, the processes #1-#N (204 a-n) are included on thewhitelist 218 for the controller 202 and are operating within theirpermitted contexts, but the process #2 has a known exploit that is usedby hackers to implant a small footprint malware 208 that then, ifexecuted, could download a larger malicious binary that may be launchedas a privileged process. A whitelist security agent that is part of asecurity middleware layer that is implemented by the OS 210 can blockthe small footprint malware 208 and the larger the malicious process 206from being executed by the controller 202 because they are not includedin the whitelist 218 and/or they are attempting to operate the process204 b (with a known exploit) outside of its permittedcontext—effectively blocking the malicious process 206 and the smallfootprint malware 208 from being executed by the CPU 212 and used tocorrupt the memory 214 (e.g., buffer overrun attack).

For example, the whitelist 218 can include permitted contexts among thewhitelisted processes/programs/binaries/scripts/etc. that can bereferenced to determine whether operations being performed by thecontroller 202 are within the expected/known parameters and should bepermitted or blocked. The security middleware layer can, for example,integrate with the OS 210 program loading and the access services. Thesecurity middleware layer can perform whitelist operations for any of avariety of processes and/or applications, such as executable files,shared objects (libraries), scripts, and/or other binaries/objects thatare executable by the controller 202. For example, every time a process(e.g., an executable file, a shared object (library), a script, and/orother binary/object) is loaded, the process's SHA256 signature can becalculated and compared to a database of approved process signatures(whitelist 218), and the context for the controller 202 can bedetermined and compared against a list of approved context within whichthe process can be executed by the controller 202. If the process isapproved, it will be allowed to run and will run normally on thecontroller 202 without any interference. If a process's signature doesnot exist in the whitelist database 218, the loading process can beaborted and an appropriate audit log entry can be written.

The incorporation of contextual-based authentication of processes on thecontroller 202 can provide a variety of advantages over whitelists thatdo not incorporate contexts. For example, binary process authorizationthrough whitelists can be binary—either the process is authenticated orit is not—and may not be granular enough in the sense that processesload binary libraries, textual scripts and configuration files as partof their normal functionality. Moreover, processes use OS 210 resourcessuch as hardware devices and network ports without guaranteeing theirauthenticity. Thus can create an attack vector to replace such a binarylibrary, text file or OS resource with a malicious one, and have thewhitelisted-verified process execute it naively and unknowingly performa malicious action.

Given that whitelists can be deterministic by nature—meaning, a binaryprocess can either run or not run—context can be used to allow thevehicle to better determine whether a process is behaving correctlybased on the vehicle's operational state. For example, some processesshould only be allowed to run when the car is starting, but should beconsidered malicious afterwards. For example, built-in-tests are allowedduring maintenance and service, but should not be allowed during normaldriving. These example contextual whitelists for processes can help thecontroller 202 avoid malicious use of otherwise authenticated processesthat, without context, might go undetected.

The process whitelist 218 can include, for example, whitelist elementswith at least these fields:

-   -   1. Name    -   2. Type {Binary file/Binary library/Script file/Configuration        file/Hardware resource}    -   3. Digital Signature    -   4. Context {Initiation state/Shutdown state/Operational state/In        motion state/Contextl/ . . . /Context N/All}

Additionally, context-based whitelist checks can be performed withincreased granularity on the controller 202 to ensure that authorizedprocesses operate within their approved bounds. For example, granularcontext-based whitelisting can include checks being added for thefollowing operations by the controller 202:

-   -   1. File Open operations: during any load of Configuration and        Script files. Digital signature and context can be verified by        the controller 202.    -   2. Load Library Operations: during any load of Binary libraries.        Digital signature and context can be verified by the controller        202.    -   3. OS resource operations: during any interaction with hardware        devices or network ports. Digital signature and context can be        verified by the controller 202.

FIG. 3 depicts is an example process whitelist 300. The examplewhitelist 300 includes a number of fields for each process, such as aunique identifier 302 (e.g., system-level process identifier), a processname 304 (e.g., name of the executable file), a file type 306 (e.g.,binary, script, executable library), a digital signature 308 (e.g.,SHA256 signature, checksums, cyclic redundancy check (CRC) signature),and permitted context 310 (e.g., initiation state, shutdown state,operational state, in motion state, specific context N, all). Thewhitelist 300 can be maintained, for example, on the controller 202using one or more security features, such as being stored as read onlywith root level permissions and/or being encrypted on the controller202. Example entries 312 a-n in the whitelist 300 are also depicted.

FIG. 4 is example pseudocode for implementing context-based whitelistson a controller.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart of an example technique 500 for implementing acontext-based whitelist on a controller. The technique 500 can beperformed by any of a variety of appropriate controllers, such as thecontroller 114, the ECUs 156 a-n, the controller 202, and/or othercontrollers. A normal call for execution of a whitelisted command ismade (502). The controller retrieves a whitelist element for the commandand determines whether the command is for a malware process and, if thecommand is not malware, whether the process is requested to be performedout of a permitted context (504). If the command is either malware(e.g., signature for the process does not match the signature in thewhitelist) or is being performed out of its context, the command isrejected and a report is generated far the malicious attempt (506). Ifthe command passes the whitelist check on both the process signature andthe permitted context, then the command is executed (508). Thecontroller then resumes normal operation (510).

FIG. 6 is a flowchart of an example technique 600 for implementing acontext-based whitelist on a controller. The technique 600 can beperformed by any of a variety of appropriate controllers, such as thecontroller 114, the ECUs 156 a-n, the controller 202, and/or othercontrollers. A controller receives a current context (602), a processexecution command (604), and a whitelist entry for the processidentified in the command (604), and determines whether the processexecution is allowed according to the permitted context identified inthe whitelist (608). If the context is not included on the whitelistedcontexts for the process, then the process execution is blocked and themalware is reported (610). If the context is included on the whitelistedcontexts for the process, then the execution of the process can proceed(612). Normal operation of the controller can continue (614).

FIG. 7 is a flowchart of an example technique 700 for implementing acontext-based whitelist on a controller. The technique 700 can beperformed by any of a variety of appropriate controllers, such as thecontroller 114, the ECUs 156 a-n, the controller 202, and/or othercontrollers. A process call is received (702), which causes thecontroller to obtain a stored whitelist element for the process (704).The controller can determine a signature for the process call (706) cancompare the determined signature against the stored signature for theprocess in the whitelist (708). If the signatures do not match, then anerror can be returned (710), and the process can be blocked from beingexecuted and logged (712). If the signatures do match, then thecontroller can proceed to check the current context of thecontroller/device before permitting the process to be executed. To dothis, the controller can obtain a current context (714) and determinewhether the current context is one of the permitted contexts withinwhich the process can be executed, as defined by the whitelist elementfor the process (716). If the context is not one of the whitelistedcontexts for the process, then an error can be returned (718), and theprocess can be blocked from being executed and logged (720). If thecontext is one of the whitelisted contexts for the process, then theprocess call can be transmitted to the processor for execution (722) andinformation on the process call can be logged, such as context information when the process call was made (724). The controller cancontinue with operation (726).

A number of implementations are possible. In one implementation, amethod for managing processes in an automotive controller can includereceiving a request to run a process execution procedure; based on acurrent context of at least one automotive system, determining if theprocess execution procedure is allowable on the automotive controller inthe current context in the whitelist; upon a condition in which theprocess execution procedure is allowable on the automotive controller inthe current context in the whitelist, allowing execution of the processexecution procedure.

Such an implementation can optionally include one or more of thefollowing features. The receiving, determining and allowing can beexecuted by the automotive controller. The method can further includeexecuting the process execution procedure by the automotive controller.The automotive controller can be selected from a group includinginfotainment controller, telematics controller, main computercontroller, ABS system controller, navigation system controller,communication system controller, braking system controller, air bagsystem controller and wheel pressure controller. The process executionprocedure can be received in a context of the automotive controllerselected from a group consisting of: Initiation state, Shutdown state,Operational state, In motion state.

In another implementation, a method for managing processes in anautomotive controller can include receiving a request to load a softwarelibrary; based on a current context of at least one automotive system,determining if the load a software library is allowable on theautomotive controller in the current context in the whitelist; upon acondition in which the load a software library procedure is allowable onthe automotive controller in the current context in the whitelist,allowing execution of the load a software library procedure.

Such an implementation can optionally include one or more of thefollowing features. The receiving, determining and allowing can beexecuted by the automotive controller. The method can further includeexecuting the load a software library procedure by the automotivecontroller. The automotive controller can be selected from groupconsisting of: infotainment controller, telematics controller, maincomputer controller, ABS system controller, navigation systemcontroller, communication system controller, braking system controller,air bag system controller and wheel pressure controller. The load asoftware library procedure can be received in a context of theautomotive controller selected from a group consisting of: Initiationstate, Shutdown state, Operational state, In motion state.

In another implementation, a method for managing processes in anautomotive controller can include receiving a request to execute ascript file; based on a current context of at least one automotivesystem, determining if the script execution procedure is allowable onthe automotive controller in the current context in the whitelist; upona condition in which the script execution procedure is allowable on theautomotive controller in the current context in the whitelist, allowingexecution of the script execution procedure.

Such an implementation can optionally include one or more of thefollowing features. The receiving, determining and allowing can beexecuted by the automotive controller. The method can further includeexecuting the script execution procedure by the automotive controller.The automotive controller can be selected from a group consisting of:infotainment controller, telematics controller, main computercontroller, ABS system controller, navigation system controller,communication system controller, braking system controller, air bagsystem controller and wheel pressure controller. The script executionprocedure can be received in a context of the automotive controllerselected from a group consisting of: Initiation state, Shutdown state,Operational state, In motion state.

In another implementation, a method for managing processes in anautomotive controller can include receiving a request to use anoperating system resource: based on a current context of at least oneautomotive system, determining if the use an operating system resourceis allowable on the automotive controller in the current context in thewhitelist; upon a condition in which the use of an operating systemresource procedure is allowable on the automotive controller in thecurrent context in the whitelist, allowing use of the operating systemresource procedure.

Such an implementation can optionally include one or more of thefollowing features. The receiving, determining and allowing can beexecuted by the automotive controller. The method can farther includeexecuting the use an operating system resource procedure by theautomotive controller. The automotive controller can be selected from agroup consisting of infotainment controller, telematics controller, maincomputer controller, ABS system controller, navigation systemcontroller, communication system controller, braking system controller,air bag system controller and wheel pressure controller. The use of anoperating system resource procedure can be received in a context of theautomotive controller selected from a group consisting of: Initiationstate, Shutdown state, Operational state, In motion state.

In another implementation, an automotive processing system can include amemory unit storing a whitelist; and an automotive controller operableto: receive a request to run a process execution procedure; determine,based on a current context of at least one automotive system, if theprocess execution procedure is allowable on the automotive controller inthe current context in the whitelist; and upon a condition in which theprocess execution procedure is allowable on the automotive controller inthe current context in the whitelist, executing the process executionprocedure.

Such an implementation can optionally include one or more of thefollowing features. The receiving, determining and allowing can beexecuted by the automotive controller. The automotive processing systemcan further include executing the process execution procedure by theautomotive controller. The automotive controller can be selected from agroup consisting of infotainment controller, telematics controller, maincomputer controller, ABS system controller, navigation systemcontroller, communication system controller, braking system controller,air bag system controller and wheel pressure controller. The processexecution procedure can be received in a context of the automotive,controller selected from a group consisting of: Initiation state,Shutdown state, Operational state, In motion state.

In another implementation, an automotive processing system can includememory unit storing a whitelist; and an automotive controller operableto receive a request to load a software library; determine, based on acurrent context of at least one automotive system, if the load asoftware library procedure is allowable on the automotive controller inthe current context in the whitelist; and upon a condition in which theload a software library procedure is allowable on the automotivecontroller in the current context in the whitelist, executing the load asoftware library procedure.

Such an implementation can optionally include one or more of thefollowing features. The receiving, determining and allowing can beexecuted by the automotive controller. The automotive processing systemcan further include executing the load a software library procedure bythe automotive controller. The automotive controller can be selectedfrom a group consisting of: infotainment controller, telematicscontroller, main computer controller, ABS system controller, navigationsystem controller, communication system controller, braking systemcontroller, air bag system controller and wheel pressure controller. Theload a software library procedure can be received in a context of theautomotive controller selected from a group consisting of: Initiationstate, Shutdown state, Operational state, In motion state.

In another implementation, an automotive processing system can includememory unit storing a whitelist; and an automotive controller operableto: receive a request to execute a script file; determine, based on acurrent context of at least one automotive system, if the scriptexecution procedure is allowable on the automotive controller in thecurrent context in the whitelist; and upon a condition in which thescript execution procedure is allowable on the automotive controller inthe current context in the whitelist, executing the script executionprocedure.

Such an implementation can optionally include one or more of thefollowing features. The receiving, determining and allowing can beexecuted by the automotive controller. The automotive processing systemcan further include executing the script execution procedure by theautomotive controller. The automotive controller can be selected from agroup consisting of: infotainment controller, telematics controller,main computer controller, ABS system controller, navigation systemcontroller, communication system controller, braking system controller,air bag system controller and wheel pressure controller. The scriptexecution procedure can be received in a context of the automotivecontroller selected from a group consisting of: Initiation state,Shutdown state, Operational state, In motion state.

In another implementation, an automotive processing system can includememory unit storing a whitelist; and an automotive controller operableto receive a request to use an operating system resource determine,based on a current context of at least one automotive system, if the useof an operating system resource procedure is allowable on the automotivecontroller in the current context in the whitelist; and upon a conditionin which the use of an operating system resource procedure is allowableon the automotive controller in the current context in the whitelist,allowing use of the operating system resource procedure.

Such an implementation can optionally include one or more of thefollowing features. The receiving, determining and allowing can beexecuted by the automotive controller. The automotive processing systemcan further include executing the use an operating system resourceprocedure by the automotive controller. The automotive controller can beselected from a group consisting of: infotainment controller, telematicscontroller, main computer controller, ABS system controller, navigationsystem controller, communication system controller, braking systemcontroller, air bag system controller and wheel pressure controller. Theuse of an operating system resource procedure can be received in acontext of the automotive controller selected from a group consistingof: Initiation state, Shutdown state, Operational state, In motionstate.

FIG. 8 is a block diagram of example computing devices 800, 850 that maybe used to implement the systems and methods described in this document,as either a client or as a server or plurality of servers. Computingdevice 800 is intended to represent various forms of digital computers,such as laptops, desktops, workstations, personal digital assistants,servers, blade servers, mainframes, and other appropriate computers.Computing device 800 is further intended to represent any othertypically non-mobile devices, such as televisions or other electronicdevices with one or more processers embedded therein or attachedthereto. Computing device 850 is intended to represent various forms ofmobile devices, such as personal digital assistants, cellulartelephones, smartphones, and other computing devices. The componentsshown here, their connections and relationships, and their functions,are meant to be examples only, and are not meant to limitimplementations of the inventions described and/or claimed in thisdocument.

Computing device 800 includes a processor 802, memory 804, a storagedevice 806, a high-speed controller 808 connecting to memory 804 andhigh-speed expansion ports 810, and a low-speed controller 812connecting to low-speed bus 814 and storage device 806. Each of thecomponents 802, 804, 806, 808, 810, and 812, are interconnected usingvarious busses, and may be mounted on a common motherboard or in othermanners as appropriate. The processor 802 can process instructions forexecution within the computing device 800, including instructions storedin the memory 804 or on the storage device 806 to display graphicalinformation for a GUI on an external input/output device, such asdisplay 816 coupled to high-speed controller 308. In otherimplementations, multiple processors and/or multiple buses may be used,as appropriate, along with multiple memories and types of memory. Also,multiple computing devices 800 may be connected, with each deviceproviding portions of the necessary operations (e.g., as a server bank,a group of blade servers, or a multi-processor system).

The memory 804 stores information within the computing device 800. Inone implementation, the memory 804 is a computer-readable medium. In oneimplementation, the memory 804 is a volatile memory unit or units. Inanother implementation, the memory 804 is a non-volatile memory unit orunits.

The storage device 806 is capable of providing mass storage for thecomputing device 800. In one implementation, the storage device 806 is acomputer-readable medium. In various different implementations, thestorage device 806 may be a floppy disk device, a hard disk device, anoptical disk device, or a tape device, a flash memory or other similarsolid state memory device, or an array of devices, including devices ina storage area network or other configurations. In one implementation, acomputer program product is tangibly embodied in an information carrier.The computer program product contains instructions that, when executed,perform one or more methods, such as those described above. Theinformation carrier is a computer- or machine-readable medium, such asthe memory 804, the storage device 806, or memory on processor 802.

The high-speed controller 808 manages bandwidth-intensive operations forthe computing device 800, while the low-speed controller 812 manageslower bandwidth-intensive operations. Such allocation of duties is anexample only. In one implementation, the high-speed controller 808 iscoupled to memory 804, display 816 (e.g., through a graphics processoror accelerator), and to high-speed expansion ports 810, which may acceptvarious expansion cards (not shown). In the implementation, low-speedcontroller 812 is coupled to storage device 806 and low-speed bus 814.The low-speed bus 814 (e.g., a low-speed expansion port), which mayinclude various communication ports (e.g., USB, Bluetooth®, Ethernet,wireless Ethernet), may be coupled to one or more input/output devices,such as a keyboard, a pointing device, a scanner, or a networking devicesuch as a switch or router, e.g., through a network adapter.

The computing device 800 may be implemented in a number of differentforms, as shown in the figure. For example, it may be implemented as astandard server 820, or multiple times in a group of such servers. Itmay also be implemented as part of a rack server system 824. Inaddition, it may be implemented in a personal computer such as a laptopcomputer 822. Alternatively, components from computing device 800 may becombined with other components in a mobile device (not shown), such ascomputing device 850. Each of such devices may contain one or more ofcomputing devices 800, 850, and an entire system may be made up ofmultiple computing devices 800, 850 communicating with each other.

Computing device 850 includes a processor 852, memory 864, aninput/output device such as a display 854, a communication interface866, and a transceiver 868, among other components. The computing device850 may also be provided with a storage device, such as a micro-drive orother device, to provide additional storage. Each ofthe components 850,852, 864, 854, 866, and 868, are interconnected using various buses, andseveral of the components may be mounted on a common motherboard or inother manners as appropriate.

The processor 852 can process instructions for execution within thecomputing device 850, including instructions stored in the memory 864.The processor may also include separate analog and digital processors.The processor may provide, for example, for coordination of the othercomponents of the computing device 850, such as control of userinterfaces, applications run by computing device 850, and wirelesscommunication by computing device 850.

Processor 852 may communicate, with a user through control interface 858and display interface 856 coupled to a display 854. The display 854 maybe, for example, a TFT LCD display or an OLED display, or otherappropriate display technology. The display interface 856 may compriseappropriate circuitry for driving the display 854 to present graphicaland other information to a user. The control interface 858 may receivecommands from a user and convert them for submission to the processor852. In addition, an external interface 862 may be provided incommunication with processor 852, so as to enable near areacommunication of computing device 850 with other devices. Externalinterface 862 may provide, for example, for wired communication (e.g.,via a docking procedure) or for wifeless communication (e.g., viaBluetooth® or other such technologies).

The memory 864 stores information within the computing device 850. Inone implementation, the memory 864 is a computer-readable medium. In oneimplementation, the memory 864 is a volatile memory unit or units. Inanother implementation, the memory 864 is a non-volatile memory unit orunits. Expansion memory 874 may also be provided and connected tocomputing device 850 through expansion interface 872, which may include,for example, a subscriber identification module (SIM) card interface.Such expansion memory 874 may provide extra storage space for computingdevice 850, or may also store applications or other information forcomputing device 850. Specifically, expansion memory 874 may includeinstructions to carry out or supplement the processes described above,and may include secure information also. Thus, for example, expansionmemory 874 may be provide as a security module for computing device 850,and may be programmed with instructions that permit secure use ofcomputing device 850. In addition, secure applications may be providedvia the SIM cards, along with additional information, such as placingidentifying information on the SIM card in a non-hackable manner.

The memory may include for example, flash memory and/or MRAM memory, asdiscussed below. In one implementation, a computer program product istangibly embodied in an information carrier. The computer programproduct contains instructions that, when executed, perform one or moremethods, such as those described above. The information carrier is acomputer- or machine-readable medium, such as the memory 864, expansionmemory 874, or memory on processor 852.

Computing device 850 may communicate wirelessly through communicationinterface 866, which may include digital signal processing circuitrywhere necessary. Communication interface 866 may provide forcommunications under various modes or protocols, such as GSM voicecalls, SMS, EMS, or MMS messaging, CDMA, TDMA, PDC, WCDMA, CDMA2000, orGPRS, among others. Such communication may occur, for example, throughtransceiver 868 (e.g., a radio-frequency transceiver). In addition,short-range communication may occur, such as using a Bluetooth®, WiFi,or other such transceiver (not shown). In addition, GPS receiver module870 may provide additional wireless data to computing device 850, whichmay be used as appropriate by applications running on computing device850.

Computing device 830 may also communicate audibly using audio codec 860,which may receive spoken information from a user and convert it tousable digital information. Audio codec 860 may likewise generateaudible sound for a user, such as through a speaker, e.g., in a handsetof computing device 850. Such sound may include sound from voicetelephone calls, may include recorded sound (e.g., voice messages, musicfiles, etc.) and may also include sound generated by applicationsoperating on computing device 850.

The computing device 850 may be implemented in a number of differentforms, as shown in the figure. For example, it may be implemented as acellular telephone 880. It may also be implemented as part of asmartphone 882, personal digital assistant, or other mobile device.

Various implementations of the systems and techniques described here canbe realized in digital electronic circuitry, integrated circuitry,specially designed ASICs (application specific integrated circuits),computer hardware, firmware, software, and/or combinations thereof.These various implementations can include implementation in one or morecomputer programs that are executable and/or interpretable on aprogrammable system including at least one programmable processor, whichmay be special or general purpose, coupled to receive data andinstructions from, and to transmit data and instructions to, a storagesystem, at least one input device, and at least one output device.

These computer programs (also known as programs, software, softwareapplications or code) include machine instructions for a programmableprocessor, and can be implemented in a high-level procedural and/orobject-oriented programming language, and/or in assembly/machinelanguage. Other programming paradigms can be used, e.g., functionalprogramming, logical programming, or other programming. As used herein,the terms “machine-readable medium” “computer-readable medium” refers toany computer program product, apparatus and/or device (e.g., magneticdiscs, optical disks, memory, Programmable Logic Devices (PLDs)) used toprovide machine instructions and/or data to a programmable processor,including a machine-readable medium that receives machine instructionsas a machine-readable signal. The term “machine-readable signal” refersto any signal used to provide machine instructions and/or data to aprogrammable processor.

To provide for interaction with a user, the systems and techniquesdescribed here can be implemented on a computer having a display device(e.g., a CRT (cathode ray tube) or LCD (liquid crystal display) monitor)for displaying information to the user and a keyboard and a pointingdevice (e.g., a mouse or a trackball) by which the user can provideinput to the computer. Other kinds of devices can be used to provide forinteraction with a user as well; for example, feedback provided to theuser can be any form of sensory feedback (e.g., visual feedback,auditory feedback, or tactile feedback); and input from the user can bereceived in any form, including acoustic, speech, or tactile input.

The systems and techniques described here can be implemented in acomputing system that includes a back end component (e.g., as a dataserver), or that includes a middleware component (e.g., an applicationserver), or that includes a front end component (e.g., a client computerhaving a graphical user interface or a Web browser through which a usercan interact with an implementation of the systems and techniquesdescribed here), or any combination of such back end, middleware, orfront end components. The components of the system can be interconnectedby any form or medium of digital data communication (e.g., acommunication network). Examples of communication networks include alocal area network (“LAN”), a wide area network (“WAN”), and theInternet.

The computing system can include clients and servers. A client andserver are generally remote from each other and typically interactthrough a communication network. The relationship of client and serverarises by virtue of computer programs running on the respectivecomputers and having a client-server relationship to each other.

While this specification contains many specific implementation details,these should not be construed as limitations on the scope of anyinventions or of what may be claimed, but rather as descriptions offeatures specific to particular implementations of particularinventions. Certain features that are described in this specification inthe context of separate implementations can also be implemented incombination in a single implementation. Conversely, various featuresthat are described in the context of a single implementation can also beimplemented in multiple implementations separately or in any suitablesub-combination. Moreover, although features may be described above asacting in certain combinations and even initially claimed as such, oneor more features from a claimed combination can in some cases be excisedfrom the combination, and the claimed combination may be directed to asub-combination or variation of a sub-combination.

Similarly, while operations are depicted in the drawings in a particularorder, this should not be understood as requiring that such operationsbe performed in the particular order shown or in sequential order, orthat all illustrated operations be perforated, to achieve desirableresults. In certain circumstances, multitasking and parallel processingmay be advantageous. Moreover, the separation of various systemcomponents in the implementations described above should not beunderstood as requiring such separation in all implementations, and itshould be understood that the described program components and systemscan generally be integrated together in a single software product orpackaged into multiple software products.

Thus, particular implementations of the subject matter have beendescribed. Other implementations are within the scope of the followingclaims. In some cases, the actions recited in the claims can beperformed in a different order and still achieve desirable results. Inaddition, the processes depicted in the accompanying figures do notnecessarily require the particular order shown, or sequential order, toachieve desirable results. In certain implementations, multitasking andparallel processing may be advantageous.

The invention claimed is:
 1. A method for providing security on anetwork-connected data processing controller, the method comprising:launching, by the network-connected data processing controller, asecurity layer that includes a whitelist of permitted processes on thenetwork-connected data processing controller, the whitelist includingreference signatures for processes that are approved; identifying, atthe security layer, a request to run a particular process; determining,by the security layer, a signature for the particular process;determining, by the security layer, whether the particular process ispermitted to be run on the network-connected data processing controllerbased on: a first comparison of the determined signature with at leastone of the reference signatures for the particular process; and a secondcomparison of a current real-time controller operating context to areference real-time controller operating context of thenetwork-connected data processing controller; blocking, by the securitylayer, the particular process from running on the network-connected dataprocessing controller based on at least one of the first comparison orthe second comparison; and making available, from the network-connecteddata processing controller to an external computer resource, informationthat identifies the particular process as being blocked.
 2. The methodof claim 1, wherein the whitelist includes at least one of: a permittedprogram binary, script, network behavior, device, configuration file,hardware resource, operating system (OS) resource, or function.
 3. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the network-connected data processingcontroller is part of a home automation device or an appliance.
 4. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the identified request comprises a request toload a software library.
 5. The method of claim 1, wherein theidentified request comprises a request to execute a script file.
 6. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the identified request comprises a request touse an OS resource.
 7. The method of claim 1, wherein the identifiedrequest comprises a request to run a process execution procedure.
 8. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the whitelist is generated based on staticanalysis of permitted processes or an operating system for thenetwork-connected data processing controller.
 9. The method of claim 1,wherein the information that identifies the particular process as beingblocked comprises at least one of: a malware source, a malware path, ora context of the network-connected data processing controller.
 10. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the information that identifies theparticular process as being blocked is first information, and the methodfurther comprises combining the first information with secondinformation from a device separate from the network-connected dataprocessing controller.
 11. The method of claim 1, wherein the referencereal-time controller operating context of the network-connected dataprocessing controller comprises at least one of: a state of a device ofwhich the network-connected data processing controller is a part or astate of surrounding of the device.
 12. The method of claim 1, whereinthe whitelist is stored as read-only or is encrypted.
 13. Anon-transitory computer readable medium including instructions that,when executed by at least one processor, cause the at least oneprocessor to perform operations for providing security on anetwork-connected data processing controller, comprising: launching, bythe network-connected data processing controller, a security layer thatincludes a whitelist of permitted processes on the network-connecteddata processing controller, the whitelist including reference signaturesfor processes that are approved; identifying, at the security layer, arequest to run a particular process; determining, by the security layer,a signature for the particular process; determining, by the securitylayer, whether the particular process is permitted to be run on thenetwork-connected data processing controller based on: a firstcomparison of the determined signature with at least one of thereference signatures for the particular process; and a second comparisonof a current real-time controller operating context to a referencereal-time controller operating context of the network-connected dataprocessing controller; blocking, by the security layer, the particularprocess from running on the network-connected data processing controllerbased on at least one of the first comparison or the second comparison;and making available, from the network-connected data processingcontroller to an external computer resource, information that identifiesthe particular process as being blocked.
 14. The non-transitory computerreadable medium of claim 13, wherein making available the informationthat identifies the particular process as being blocked occurs when thenetwork-connected data processing controller reaches a pre-determinedlevel of processing capacity or bandwidth.
 15. The non-transitorycomputer readable medium of claim 13, wherein: the network-connecteddata processing controller is a first network-connected data processingcontroller; and the reference real-time controller operating contextincludes a use or status of a second network-connected data processingcontroller.
 16. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 13,wherein the whitelist includes at least one of: a permitted programbinary, script, network behavior, device, configuration file, hardwareresource, operating system (OS) resource, or function.
 17. Thenon-transitory computer readable medium of claim 13, wherein theidentified request comprises at least one of: a request to load asoftware library; a request to execute a script file; a request to usean OS resource; or a request to run a process execution procedure. 18.The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 13, wherein theinformation that identifies the particular process as being blockedcomprises at least one of: a malware source, a malware path, or acontext of the network-connected data processing controller.
 19. Thenon-transitory computer readable medium of claim 13, wherein thereference real-time controller operating context of thenetwork-connected data processing controller comprises at least one of:a state of a device of which the network-connected data processingcontroller is a part or a state of surrounding of the device.
 20. Thenon-transitory computer readable medium of claim 13, wherein thewhitelist is stored as read-only or is encrypted.